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Transnational Conservation Contracts
NATASHA AFFOLDER∗
Abstract
Transnational environmental law is the subject of growing scholarly interest. Yet, much work
remains to be done to fill in both the conceptual and empirical contours of this field. One
methodological challenge that transnational law poses is the need to look beyond traditional
sources of international and national law. This article contributes to efforts to understand
transnational law’smultilayered architecture by drawing attention to the use of transnational
contractsasamechanismtoprotecthabitatsandspecies.Thediverseandproliferatingexamples
of conservation contracts discussed in this article – which include forest carbon agreements,
conservation concessions, debt-for-nature swaps, conservation performance payments, and
private protected area agreements – reveal an ongoing and intensifying transnational attempt
to use private contracts to address some of the most pressing issues of common concern. This
article draws on fairness theory in both contract and international environmental law to argue
for law’s relevance in interpreting conservation’s call for contracts.
KeyWords
conservation agreements; environmental contracts; fairness; transnational law
1. INTRODUCTION
July, 2002: The Government of Guyana concludes a 30-year Conservation Concession
Agreement with US-based Conservation International. Pursuant to the agreement,
the conservation organization leases 200,000 acres of primary rainforest in the Upper
Essequibowatershed,payingannual feescomparabletowhata loggingcompanywould
pay if the area was leased for forestry purposes.
January, 2009: Waigeo Island, Raja Ampats, Indonesia: Ecotourism company Papua
Expeditions, with funding from a Chicago-based donor, concludes a Community Con-
servation and Ecotourism Agreement with the customary landholding groups. The
agreement specifies the company’s contractual financial obligations and the carefully
defined conservation outcomes to be provided by the community.
August, 2010, Ecuador and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) sign an
agreement to establish a trust fund, which aims at financially compensating the South
American country for refraining from oil drilling in its Yasunı´ National Park.
Transnational environmental law is being made by contract. Yet, the significance
of these agreements as an aspect of transnational legal governance is easy to miss,
as individual contracts are constructed as isolated, unrelated, one-off phenomena.
∗ Associate Professor, University of British Columbia Faculty of Law [affolder@law.ubc.ca]. I thank the par-
ticipants in the European Society of International Law’s International Environmental Law Interest Group
Workshop on Fairness in International Environmental Law for helpful comments. I am also grateful for the
highly skilled research assistance of Asad Kiyani and Jalia Kangave.
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The highly varied form and substance of these agreements further obscure the phe-
nomenon of contracting as a collective practice or transnational instrument choice.
The above narratives describe three anecdotal accounts of unrelated and distinct
agreements to protect biodiversity. The object of this article is to argue that these
disparate agreements are revealing of a more widespread, if little-noticed, turn to
contracts as amechanism of transnational environmental law. This article provides
an introduction to one manifestation of this practice – transnational conservation
contracts.
Transnational conservation contracts can be defined as agreements to conserve
discrete areas of land or water, including valued, endangered, or critical habitat,
between actors in more than one country. These agreements are transnational,
rather than international, in the sense that they involve parties in different jurisdic-
tions, but theyarenot constituted through theco-operationof states.While the legal
statusof theseagreementsdiffersdramatically, it isuseful tosituate theseagreements
within the growing field of transnational law, and more particularly as an example
of transnational environmental law. Transnational conservation contracts thus take
legal scholars beyond ‘current conceptual comfort zones’ of contemplating law as
either domestic (state) or international (inter-state).1 They reveal a density of inter-
actions between international organizations, sub-state governments, multinational
corporations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), indigenous peoples, foun-
dations, community groups, and individual landowners that transcend state bor-
ders. They evidence what scholars of global environmental politics have described
as the ‘rescaling of environmental politics’2 both beyond and within the state.
The choice of describing transnational conservation agreements as ‘contracts’
is a deliberate one. These agreements vary significantly. Some are legally binding;
others are not. Many examples might more appropriately be described as pledges,
or restrictive covenants, or commitments, or somemore amorphously as ‘voluntary
agreements’ or ‘hybrid agreements’. But speaking the language of contracting en-
courages a legal analysis of these agreements,whichmight otherwise not takeplace.
As Karl Llewellyn explained in 1930, ‘contract comes to a lawyer as a term laden
with connotations of doctrine and theory’.3 One of the consequences of the fact that
conservation contracts largely escape the scrutiny of lawyers is that their legality
is rarely investigated. Talking about these agreements as ‘contracts’ invites a closer
look at the text of these agreements and their legality.
To date, transnational conservation contracts have been framed and debated
as a market tool.4 They are emerging, in particular, as a favoured tool of certain
United States-based conservation organizations who argue that global threats to
biodiversity are sufficiently urgent to merit direct action such as ‘renting’ forests in
1 C. Scott, ‘“Transnational Law” as Proto-Concept: Three Conceptions’, (2009) 10 German Law Journal 859, at
876.
2 L. B. Andonova and R. B. Mitchell, ‘The Rescaling of Global Environmental Politics’, (2010) 35Annual Review
of Environment and Resources 255.
3 K. Llewellyn, ‘What Price Contract? An Essay in Perspective’, (1930) 40 Yale Law Journal 704, at 704.
4 See, e.g., OECD, Handbook of Market Creation for Biodiversity: Issues in Implementation (2004), which frames a
number of conservation contracts as attempts to create markets for biodiversity.
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foreigncountriesor tradingdebt forprotectedareas.Theglacialpaceof international
treaty negotiations creates an appetite for quicker ‘fixes’ to transnational problems
such as threatened-species extinctions or critical-habitat destruction. Conservation
contracts emergeasone suchfix.Butdiscussionof these agreementshasbeen largely
limited to the conservation biology literature and to the policy literature generated
by conservation groups that examines conservation agreements as amechanism for
providing direct payments for environmental services (PES). Current debates thus
largely focus on a single question: do they work?
Framing conservation contracts within the context of transnational environ-
mental law refocuses attention on a new set of questions. An initial exercise in
lumping together diverse agreements is thus a precursor to the valuable analysis
that follows. Creating a taxonomy of conservation contracts will allow for detailed
inquiries into the legality of these agreements, and distinctions of form and sub-
stance, that may ultimately lead to drafting better agreements.5
Thinking about transnational conservation contracts as transnational environ-
mental law refreshes the current debates beyond polarized visions of their effective-
ness. It allowsus to take the lawmore seriously in this context. It invites a closer scru-
tiny of legal content and function. Are these intended to be legal arrangements? Are
they embeddedwithinAnglo-Americanneo-liberal assumptions of party autonomy
and freedom of contract? What choice of law is made? What are the mechanisms
for dispute resolution? Are international biodiversity norms or standards directly
or indirectly referenced? Is there an attempt to integrate other international legal
norms? How do these agreements straddle the line between contract and property
law? Do transnational conservation contracts trade away valuable property rights
that communities and indigenous groups have only recently secured? Is learning
taking place between contracts? How well are prototype contracts tailored to di-
verse cultural contexts? Transnational conservation contracts are not new. Butwhat
explains the seeming proliferation of contractual approaches?
This article is not the place to answer all of these questions. It is the place to
introduce conservation contracts and to situate them within a wider discussion of
the complex fairness challenges emerging in transnational environmental law.6 The
article begins by situating transnational contracting within a wider discussion of
transnational environmental law. The fact that many international environmental
norms are now advanced through mechanisms outside treaty instruments gives
rise to anxieties about the legitimacy, accountability, and fairness of the complex
emerging architecture of transnational environmental law.7 Transnational environ-
mental law is a helpful lens through which to assess conservation contracts, as it
5 For an illustration of the value of analysing the architecture of international agreements along lines of form
and substance, see K. Raustiala, ‘Form and Substance in International Agreements’, (2005) 99 AJIL 581.
6 Thisarticleemerges fromaworkshopinvestigatingdiverseaspectsof fairness ininternationalenvironmental
law, organized by the European Society of International Law’s International Environmental Law Interest
Group in Cambridge on 2 September 2010.
7 S. Bernstein, ‘Legitimacy in Global Environmental Governance’, (2005) 1 Journal of International Law and
International Relations 139; S. Bass and S. Gue´neau, ‘Global Forest Governance: Effectiveness, Fairness, and
Legitimacy ofMarket-Driven Approaches’, in S. Thoyer and B.Martimort-Asso (eds.), Participation for Sustain-
ability in Trade (2005).
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takes seriously the challenge of understanding non-state law-making. It allows for
thinking about these agreements as law – a new direction for research on conserva-
tion contracts.
Against this backdrop of transnational environmental law, I introduce trans-
national conservation contracts as a collective phenomenon. Section 2 of this art-
icle describes these agreements and discusses five types of contract: conservation
concession agreements, conservation performance payments, forest carbon agree-
ments, private protected area agreements, and debt-for-nature swaps. This is not
an exhaustive survey of conservation contracts. It provides a positive rather than
normative addition to literature on transnational environmental law.
The thirdandfinal sectionof thearticle seeks todeepenourunderstandingof con-
servation contracts by situating these agreements within legal debates on fairness.
Drawing on insights from fairness theory in both contract law and international
environmental law, I sketch an agenda for thinking about fairness in the context
of transnational environmental law. By building on fairness theory in both private
law and public international law, we are able to advance the study of transnational
conservation contracts in a way that takes seriously the need for a close textual
reading of contracts, but at the same time reveals the wider cultural and discursive
shifts in play in turning to contracts to protect global biodiversity.
2. TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Transnationalenvironmental lawisdescribedinanewjournaldevotedto itsanalysis
as ‘the study of environmental law and governance beyond the state. It approaches
legal and regulatory developments with an interest in the contribution of non-state
actors and an awareness of themulti-level governance context inwhich contempor-
ary environmental law unfolds’.8
The study of transnational environmental law provides an opportune moment
to assess areas of law that have developed and become important in practice, but
that are obscured by a focus on either international law or domestic law. These
issues are illuminated when one attempts to conceptualize and categorize trans-
national conservation agreements. Conservation agreements ill fit the conceptual
dichotomies that traditionally animate international environmental law.This likely
explains their invisibility in traditional accounts of international environmental
law-making. They can be seen as both top-down and bottom-up approaches. They
are public and private; state and non-state; formal and informal; hard and soft; local
and international; law and non-law.
Transnational conservation contracts provide a useful opportunity to reflect
on the relationship between transnational environmental law and international
environmental law. This is a relationship that is far from linear. Transnational
environmental law is generally conceived as something broader than inter-
national environmental law. Gregory Shaffer and Daniel Bodansky expansively
8 The first issue of Transnational Environmental Lawwill be published by Cambridge University Press in 2012;
see http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=TEL.
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conceptualize it as encompassing ‘all environmental law norms that apply to trans-
boundary activities or that have effects in more than one jurisdiction’.9 But, as
the example of transnational conservation contracts reveals, international environ-
mental law and transnational environmental law can be closely enmeshed and are
marked by a density of interactions.10
Transnational conservation contracts may attempt to implement norms articu-
lated in environmental treaties. In some cases, these contracts shadow treaty oblig-
ations. Climate-change offset agreements reference the Kyoto Protocol; access and
benefit-sharing agreements discuss obligations under the Convention on Biological
Diversity. Conservation contracts alsomake explicit reference to other sources of in-
ternational environmental standards, such as the Equator Principles, or the Interna-
tional Finance Corporation’s Performance Standards. An increased role for contract-
based measures to promote tropical forest conservation will emerge through the
ReducingEmissionsfromDeforestationandForestDegradationinDevelopingCoun-
tries (REDD+) initiatives pursuant to the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change. These interactions between treaties and contracts risk being missed if con-
tracts are not situated within the framework of transnational environmental law.
The diversity of conservation contracts, and of contracting parties, makes it dif-
ficult to generalize about issues of legality. Transnational law helps us in the task
of thinking about these agreements as law and in interpreting their wider signifi-
cance. Transnational-law theorists are making important inroads into defining and
defending the terrain of transnational non-state agreements as law.11 Gralf-Peter
Calliess and Peer Zumbansen suggest that the transnational challenge to legal the-
ory comes at amomentwhen the fields of both public international law and private
international law are already being forced to adapt to ‘increasingly decentralized
and relativized law-making forums’.12 Robert Wai argues for closer attention to
transnational private law:
An appreciation of private law as concerned with the relationship among plural and
transnational normative orders is obscured because subjects of private law and private
international law are typically considered separately. When viewed together, a sense
of the long-established task for private law of relating normative orders that challenge
state boundaries becomes clearer.13
While Robert Wai focuses on examples of international business transactions, and
Gralf-Peter Calliess and Peer Zumbansen invoke studies of corporate and consumer
transactions, theirworkcanbeusefullyextendedtothetransactionsforconservation
9 G. Shaffer and D. Bodansky, ‘Transnationalism, Unilateralism, and International Law’, (2011) Transnational
Environmental Law, forthcoming, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1920470.
10 I have argued elsewhere for the need to resist the temptation to conceptualize international law and private
governanceasbelonging to separateandparalleluniverses; seeN.Affolder, ‘ThePrivateLifeofEnvironmental
Treaties’, (2009) 103 AJIL 510.
11 See G. Teubner (ed.),Global Lawwithout a State (1996); F. von Benda-Beckmann and K. von Benda-Beckmann,
‘The Dynamics of Change and Continuity in Plural Legal Orders’, (2006) 53–4 Journal of Legal Pluralism &
Unofficial Law 1; G. P. Calliess and P. Zumbansen, Rough Consensus and Running Code: A Theory of Transnational
Private Law (2010).
12 Calliess and Zumbansen, supra note 11, at 7.
13 R.Wai, ‘The Interlegality of Transnational Private Law’, (2008) 71 Law andContemporary Problems 107, at 108.
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services that are the subject of this article. Transnational conservation contracts
rarely exhibit a full rejection of state-based law. But they are situated in a complex
world inwhichregulatoryprocessesarenot limited tostateactors.Theseagreements
open up space for thinking about ‘law-making’ in ways that challenge traditional
assumptions and conceptions.
Conservation contracts reveal forms of law-making by non-state (or private)
actors thatarecentral to the studyof transnational environmental law.Conservation
concessions, payments for ecological services, and debt-for-nature swaps all signal
a growing use of direct action by NGOs, distinct from campaigning roles.14 But
greater untangling of the private actors involved is necessary. Private actors who
are architects of these agreements, or parties to them, range from global NGOs to
local community groups to corporations to foundations. In some cases, focus on
the actors involved in these agreements obscures other important aspects of the
agreements themselves. Drawing attention to the legal nature of these agreements
invites a careful textual analysis that is rarely present in discussions of thepolitics of
agreement-making. Further, focusing on agreements as legal texts draws attention
to the fact that these contracts are not simply isolated agreements, but rather part
of the wider architecture of transnational law.
3. TRANSNATIONAL CONSERVATION CONTRACTS
Are there sufficient patterns of commonality between conservation contracts to
justify the study of something called ‘transnational conservation contracts’? Is there
any value in aggregating these diverse agreements? The limited literature on trans-
national conservation contracts addresses each type of contract as an isolated phe-
nomenon. Forest carbon agreements are thus the subject of a literature distinct from
that which analyses debt-for-nature swaps or concession agreements. This may be
due to the fact that the literature exploring these agreements has largely developed
in journals devoted to conservation biology. Viewing conservation contracts collect-
ively as a non-comprehensive category of environmental agreement makes sense
for at least three reasons: (i) contracts often involve repeat actors and architects (e.g.,
certain contractual approaches are favoured by specific conservation organizations
suchasConservation InternationalorTheNatureConservancy); (ii) there isa textual
similaritybetweenagreementsdue to the repeateduseofprototypes andprecedents;
and (iii) a collective view of contracts reveals the integration of international legal
norms within these agreements. This integration risks being missed if individual
contracts are only viewed in isolation.
In this section, I drawattention to thephenomenonof transnational conservation
contracts as a collective practice. I define transnational conservation contracts and
describe the practice of contracting by introducing five categories of contractual
approach: (i) conservation concession agreements; (ii) conservation performance
payments; (iii) forest carbon agreements; (iv) private protected area and company
14 Andonova andMitchell, supra note 2, at 262.
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reserve agreements; and (v) debt-for-nature swaps. This list is not intended to be
comprehensive; rather, it introduces the diversity of agreements that may be con-
ceptualized as transnational conservation contracts. While I loosely describe these
agreementsas contracts, their legal significanceextendsbeyondconceptsof contract
law to implicate notions of property ownership and, as I will argue, transnational
environmental law.
Transnational conservation contracts are agreements that address the protection
of discrete areas of land or water to achieve conservation objectives including the
protection of valued, endangered, or critical habitat and involve actors in more
than one country. Referring to contracts as conservation contracts is a reflection
of the fact that many of the initiatives described in this article primarily seek to
preserve or conserve biodiversity (rather than, for example, implementing regimes
for sustainable use). Conservation is a ‘social and political process bywhich natural
resources . . . are managed to maintain biodiversity’.15 The history of conservation
reflects the tensions that have emerged around this social and political process:
Activities that qualify as Conservation have, over the past 150 years, been implement-
ed by, and often in the favour of, political and national elites. Over the past 50 years,
however, asbiodiversity losshasbeenconstructedas an internationalproblem,Conser-
vation has also increasingly become the purview of international non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), many of which have come to hold greater environmental au-
thority than the governments of nation states. Often structured through class and ra-
cial bias, and ignorant of community-based practices for environmentalmanagement,
contemporary conservation policy, practice and jurisdiction has emerged out of a past
littered with struggles over sovereignty, competing ideologies of nature, conflicting
use rights, andmarkedly inequitable power relations.16
Thedescriptionoffivecategoriesof transnational conservationcontract that follows
reveals that conservation agreements are not a purely North–South phenomenon,
but theNorth–South dimensions of this transnational phenomenon require further
elucidation.
3.1. Conservation concession agreements
Conservation concessions centre on lease agreements; national authorities or local
resource users lease public lands or resources to conservation groups who commit
to use the lands for conservation purposes.17 The simplest forms of conservation
concession are modelled after extractive-industry concession agreements, such as
timber or mining concessions. Rather than mining or logging the concession area,
the conservation investor pays the government for the right not to develop the land.
The conservation group commits to protecting the lands for conservation purposes.
Payments are calculated in a way that intends to compensate the landowner for
15 J. Alcorn, ‘Big Conservation and Little Conservation: Collaboration inManaging Global and Local Heritage’,
(1995) 98 Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies Bulletin 13, at 15.
16 K. I. MacDonald, ‘Community-Based Conservation: A Reflection on History’, Working Paper: IUCN – The
World Conservation Union, Commission on Economic, Environmental and Social Policy, 2003, at 3.
17 Environmental Law Institute, Legal Tools for Private Lands Conservation in Latin America (2003), 25.
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forgoing extractive use of the land. The contract also typically includes norms and
guidelines for monitoring and enforcing the protection of the site.
Global conservation organizations active in negotiating conservation conces-
sions, such as Conservation International, tend to be repeat actors, negotiating
agreements in multiple jurisdictions.18 In certain jurisdictions, concession agree-
ments can only be concluded following domestic legal reforms, permitting the
conclusion of such agreements. For example, in 2002, the Peruvian government in-
cluded a new provision in its Forestry Law that allows conservation concessions to
be adopted as a legal form of land use. The adoption of this law followed discussions
between the Peruvian government and US conservation groups, who helped draft
the legislation.19 International conservation groups have since signed concession
agreements with the Peruvian government, including a 40-year concession agree-
ment in 2006 between the Wildlife Conservation Society and the government of
Peru to protect habitat for the endangered red uakari monkey.20 The transplant of
laws to facilitate the introduction of conservation concessions highlights the wider
implications of contractual environmental governance – the shifts in contract and
property law that occur to accommodate conservation contracts.
3.2. Conservation performance payments agreements
Conservation performance payments involve a similar approach to concession
agreements but they do not centre on lease arrangements. Rather, performance
payments involve the purchase of a well-defined environmental service (or land
use likely to secure that service) with payments that are conditional on the per-
formance of a biodiversity-related outcome such as habitat protection or species
preservation.21 These payments are often made by foreign donors or conservation
organizations to local communities or governments in low-income countries to
secure the conservation of endangered ecosystems. The motivating idea is to steer
economic development away from the most environmentally destructive forms
(such asmining or oil and gas development) and to encourage individuals and com-
munities to invest in activities that do not lead to habitat or biodiversity loss (such
as ecotourism).
Conservationperformancepaymentsareused inbothdomesticandtransnational
contexts. InSweden, for example, aperformance-payment schemewas introduced to
alleviate conflicts between carnivores and livestock. The programme, which issued
payments for carnivore offspring, was designed to stabilize populations of wolves,
18 For a review of the activities of Conservation International with direct-payment contracts, see S. Milne and
E. Niesten, Direct Payments for Biodiversity Conservation in Developing Countries: Practical Insights for Design and
Implementation (2002).
19 K. Ellison, ‘Renting Biodiversity: The Concessions Approach’, (2003) (November) 4 Conservation Magazine,
20.
20 See, generally, Lago Preto Conservation Concession, available at www.mbowler.mistral.co.uk/lagopreto.
21 Thisdefinition is adapted fromSvenWunder’s definitionofpayments for environmental services. S.Wunder,
‘The Efficiency of Payments for Environmental Services in Tropical Conservation’, (2007) 21 Conservation
Biology 48, at 50.
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 01 Aug 2012 IP address: 137.82.108.8
TRANSNATIONAL CONSERVATION CONTRACTS 451
lynxes, andwolverines.22 Thepayments are designed to offset the future damage the
carnivores are anticipated to cause. International habitat reserve programs (IHRP)
are an example of a transnational manifestation of this practice. Contracts pur-
suant to an IHRP require the outside agent (often an international conservation
organization) tomake periodic performance payments in exchange for local actors’
ensuring that target ecosystems remain protected. Compliancemonitoring ensures
that target levels of species continue to be found in the ecosystem and payments
are dependent on these targets being reached.23 While individual contracts may
contain specific provisions on monitoring and enforcement measures in the event
of non-compliance, the degree to which these contracts are enforced in practice is
unknown.
3.3. Forest carbon agreements
Forest carbon agreements are a type of performance-payment agreement. They re-
flect an approach of using markets to address the critical role of forests in helping
to mitigate the growing threat from anthropogenic climate change. Forest carbon
offset agreements are largely transacted between greenhouse-gas emitters in indus-
trialized countries and sellers in developing countries. Forest carbon agreements
are a growth area for transnational environmental law. But these agreements pose
challenges for lawyers. Forest carbon is a new form of property. Voluntary markets
have yet to conclude clear rules of property rights for forest carbon. States are still
developing legal regimes to allocate property rights in forest carbon.24 Further, the
nature of existing forest carbon markets is such that carbon buyers and sellers are
unlikely to be on unequal footing in terms of their commercial experience and legal
representation.25 Some United States-based NGOs have sought to ‘level the playing
field’ betweenbuyers and sellers by drafting prototype agreements for forest carbon-
emission reductions purchases, modelled on US contract law.26 These agreements
seek to redress the one-sided legal drafting carried out by carbon purchasers.
Forest carbonagreementshighlight legal issues relevant tomanyof theother con-
tracts discussed in this article. Inmany cases, contracting takes place against a back-
drop of unclear land tenure, including uncertainties arising from disputes between
indigenous peoples and state governments. A legal context that emphasizes free-
dom of contract may be foreign to landowners signing these agreements. Critiques
of forest carbon agreements further charge that these agreements allow ‘thewealthy
to sequester further wealth far out of proportion to the carbon sequestered’,27 that
22 A. Zabel and K. Holm-Mu¨ller, ‘Conservation Performance Payments for Carnivore Conservation in Sweden’,
(2008) 22 Conservation Biology 247.
23 P. J. Ferraro, ‘GlobalHabitatProtection:LimitationsofDevelopment InterventionsandaRole forConservation
Performance Payments’, (2001) 15 Conservation Biology 990, at 994.
24 See the Norton Rose Group, Forest Carbon Rights in REDD+ Countries: A Snapshot of Africa (2010); D. Takacs,
Forest Carbon: Law and Property Rights (2009), 28.
25 S. Hawkins et al., Contracting for Forest Carbon: Elements of a Model Forest Carbon Purchase Agreement (2010), 1.
26 Ibid., at 3.
27 D. Takacs, ‘Carbon into Gold: Forest Carbon Offsets, Climate Change Adaptation, and International Law’,
(2009) 15HastingsWest-Northwest Journal of Environmental Law and Policy 39, at 42.
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they are based on inadequate scientific knowledge of tropical forests,28 that they are
subject to leakage (that is to say that preserving forests in one location will lead to
logging elsewhere), and that they are inadequately geared to protect biodiversity.29
A significantly increased role for forest carbonagreements is contemplatedunder
REDD+, a proposed performance-based mechanism under negotiation through the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and as markets for
carbon become legally entrenched. These developments are leading to inter-state
agreementson forest conservation.Forexample, in2009,NorwayandGuyanasigned
aMemorandumofUnderstanding pertaining to forest protection.30 This agreement
provides for payments by Norway of up to US$250million during a five-year period
ending in2015 in return forGuyana’s commitment to limit forest-basedgreenhouse-
gas emissions and to protect its rainforest as an asset for theworld. A careful reading
of this Memorandum of Understanding reveals the extent to which the agreement
is embedded within other forms of transnational law. Guyana is required under
the agreement to show evidence of entering a formal dialogue with the European
Unionwith the intent of joining its Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade
processes towards a Voluntary Partnership Agreement. Guyana also has to show
evidence of its decision to enter a formal dialogue with the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative (EITI) or an alternative mechanism that the two countries
agree will advance similar aims to the EITI. These requirements, emerging out of a
MemorandumofUnderstanding, again suggest the powerful transformative impact
of contractual negotiations on domestic and transnational legal systems.
3.4. Private protected area and company reserve agreements
Company-protected areas and privately managed reserves involve private forms of
landownershipormanagement andmaybe the result of transnational conservation
contracts. These agreements involve diverse non-state actors. In some cases, con-
tractual provisions will require extractive-industry companies to put aside certain
project areas for conservation purposes as part of permitting and project approval
negotiations. In other cases, international foundations or conservation NGOs will
purchase or donate funds to local NGOs to purchase critical habitats. The extent of
privately conserved land is unknown, as these reserves and protected areas do not
fall within international mapping initiatives such as theWorld Database of Protec-
ted Areas.31 The existence of privately protected areas is confirmed by the annual
28 A. Grainger, ‘Uncertainty in the Construction of Global Knowledge of Tropical Forests’, (2010) 34 Progress in
Physical Geography 811, at 811–12.
29 O. Venter et al., ‘Harnessing Carbon Payments to Protect Biodiversity’, (2009) 326 Science 1368.
30 Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Cooperative Republic of Guyana and the
Government of theKingdomofNorway regardingCooperation on Issues related to the Fight against Climate
Change, theProtectionof Biodiversity and theEnhancementof SustainableDevelopment (2009), available at
www.regjeringen.no/upload/MD/Vedlegg/Internasjonalt/miljosamarbeid_utviklingsland/mou__norway_
guyana.pdf.
31 S. Stolton and N. Dudley, Company Reserves: Integrating Biological Reserves Owned andManaged by Commercial
Companies into theGlobal ProtectedAreasNetwork:AReviewofOptions,WWFInternationalWhitePaper,August
2007, at 5.
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reports of both private companies and conservation organizations that document
their ownership and use of private lands for conservation purposes.
Countries have developed diverse legal mechanisms for recognizing private
protected areas or reserves. Purchase agreements and conservation easements are
examples of these legalmechanisms. In LatinAmerica, for example,many countries
have legally recognized the private reserve as a device to protect private lands and a
number of conservation organizations are experimentingwith the use of easements
to provide for private land protection.32
The creation and funding of private protected areas has long been a strategy of
internationally minded conservation organizations intent on long-term protection
of lands of conservation importance.33 For example, in Costa Rica, land purchases
became a critical aspect of ‘save the rainforest’ campaigns and led to the creation of
globally recognized protected areas such as theMonteverde Rainforest.34
While companies are also participants in private land conservation, the extent of
‘companyreserves’ remainsunknown.Corporatecontributionstolandconservation
take diverse forms including the sale of land for conservation purposes, ownership
andmanagement of land for biodiversity conservation, and themanagement of land
for conservation purposes in cases in which the company is not the direct owner.35
One example of a company owning andmanaging land for conservation purposes is
theBushmanlandConservation Initiative inNamibia,where anagreementprovides
for private land protection bymining company Anglo Base Metals.36
Private and company reserves are particularly significant for forest management
and protection. Although much forest land remains owned by governments, it
is often leased to international forest companies under long-term leases. Accord-
ingly, conservationmanagementmay fall to these companies during their leasehold
periods. Forexample, in January2006, theSenepis-BuluhalaTigerConservationArea
in Indonesia was approved by the Indonesian minister of forestry. The peat swamp
forest conservation area is habitat for the Sumatran tiger, but forest companies are
granted concessions tomanage the land. These companieswillmaintain ownership
of the land under their concession licences but, according to a ministerial letter
agreement, the companies are responsible for supporting themission and activities
of the Senepis conservation area in the future.37
Distinct from funding and establishing private conservation areas is the practice
of international conservationorganizations contractingwithnational governments
to establish national forests. Conservation International, for example, signed a ‘bio-
diversity agreement’ with the government of Equatorial Guinea to establish a
National Forest. Under the agreement, the government commits to establishing
32 See, e.g., Environmental Law Institute, supra note 17, at 16, 21.
33 Ibid., at 15.
34 L. A. Vivanco,Green Encounters: Shaping and Contesting Environmentalism in Rural Costa Rica (2006), 60.
35 Stolton and Dudley, supra note 31, at 16–20.
36 Ibid. The legal form of this agreement involved a 2006 memorandum of agreement between the Botanical
Society of South Africa, Anglo Base Metals, and the Department of Tourism, Environment & Conservation,
Government of Namibia.
37 Ibid., at 19.
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a National Forest and a National Conservation Trust Fund to permanently support
the country’s biodiversity conservation.38
3.5. Debt-for-nature swaps
Debt-for-nature swaps are agreements through which foreign debt is purchased,
donated, or released in exchange for conservation efforts to be undertaken by or
on behalf of a debtor country. The emergence of these swaps is commonly traced
back to the 1980s debt crisis and a proposal byConservation International’s Thomas
Lovejoy.39 In return for commitments to set aside land as nature reserves or to adopt
sustainable management practices, debtor governments receive debt relief.
Debt-for-nature swaps divide into two broad categories: public (or bilateral debt-
reduction programmes) and private (or commercial swaps). Commercial swaps are
largely financed by private conservation organizations. Typically, swaps involve
three or more parties: an international conservation organization that donates the
funds, a conservationorganization in thehost country, andoneormore government
agencies in the host state.40 Public swaps, on the other hand, are those concluded
between debtor and creditor governments for the exchange of official debt.41
The first private debt-for-nature swap was concluded between the government
of Bolivia and Conservation International in 1987. The funds were provided to
Conservation International from a private US foundation.42 In the same year, the
World Wildlife Fund (WWF) negotiated a swap with the government of Ecuador
and another swap was concluded in Costa Rica with the facilitation of the Nature
Conservancy, WWF, Conservation International, and several other foundations.43
The late 1980s and early 1990s were also characterized by debt-for-nature swaps
between these same three conservation organizations and a number of other coun-
tries, mostly in Latin America.
While it is unclear whether these swaps have made a significant impact on
the issues of deforestation and biodiversity loss, they have been significant in re-
vealing the extent to which private conservation organizations can foster insti-
tutional innovations.44 Debt-for-nature swaps have also become bundled within
38 Conservation International, Press Release, ‘Conservation International and Equatorial Guinea Sign
Agreement to Collaborate on Conservation’, April 2006, available at Conservation International,
www.conservation.org/newsroom/pressreleases/Pages/042506_ci_equatorial_guinea_agreement.aspx.
39 T. E. Lovejoy, ‘Aid Debtor Nations’ Ecology’, New York Times, 4 October 1984, A31. On debt-for-nature swaps
generally, see P. A. Sheikh, Debt-for-Nature Initiatives and the Tropical Forest Conservation Act: Status and Imple-
mentation (2010).
40 R. T. Deacon and P. Murphy, ‘The Structure of an Environmental Transaction: The Debt-for-Nature Swap’,
(1997) 73 Land Economics 1.
41 S. Freeland and R. P. Buckley, ‘Debt-for-Development Exchanges: Using External Debt to Mitigate Environ-
mental Damage in Developing Countries’, (2010) 16West Northwest Journal of Environmental Law 77.
42 In 1987, Conservation International obtained a grant of $100,000 from the FrankWeeden Foundation,which
it used to purchase a debt of $650,000 owed to a Swiss Bank by the government of Bolivia. In exchange for
cancellation of the debt, the Bolivian government agreed to establish four conservation and sustainable-use
areas covering over 4million acres; see A. U. Sarkar and K. L. Ebbs, ‘A Possible Solution to Tropical Troubles?
Debt-for-Nature Swaps’, (1992) 24 Futures 653, at 658, 659.
43 A. Lewis, ‘The Evolving Process of Swapping Debt for Nature’, (1999) 10 Colorado Journal of International
Environmental Law & Policy 431.
44 C. Jakobeit, ‘Non-State Actors Leading the Way: Debt-for-Nature Swaps’, in R. Keohane and M. Levy (eds.),
Institutions for Environmental Aid (1996), 127.
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wider social benefit programmes that aim to provide education, sanitation, famine
relief, and health care services in return for the adoption of nature conservation
measures.45
Especially in the case of private swaps, enforcement of agreement termshas often
proved to be difficult.46 In practice, because of concerns regarding sovereignty of
contracting states, most private contracts rarely contain clauses on remedies for
default such as arbitration, choice of forum, choice of law, or waiver of sovereign
immunity.47
The above overview of five categories of transnational conservation contract is
a preliminary effort to highlight the diversity of some of the types of conservation
contract that are currently being negotiated. This overview also reveals some of the
limits of current knowledgeof contractual arrangements. Little is knownabouthow
manyof theseagreementsarecreatedandreplicated.Evenless isknownaboutefforts
to enforce these agreements, whether through judicial or non-judicial means. The
difficulty of accessing the private texts of contractual agreements poses a significant
(but not insurmountable) impediment to a full investigation of these contractual
arrangements, and the wider fairness issues they invoke.
4. FAIRNESS AND TRANSNATIONAL CONSERVATION CONTRACTS:
WHY LABELS MATTER
Fairness is a placeholder for a number of distinct concerns. In the context of trans-
national conservation contracts, these concerns collide with those often charac-
terized as concerns about accountability, legitimacy, and transparency.48 Different
fields of law, however, frame fairness debates in distinct ways.
In this section, I draw on insights from fairness theories in both contract law
and international environmental law to explore some of the particular fairness
challenges posed by transnational conservation contracts. I am far from the first
to suggest that contract law and international law are worthy of deeper cross-
fertilization.49 This cross-fertilization between public and private law, domestic
and international law, is central to the task of articulating and conceptualizing
transnational environmental law.
45 J. Kaiser and A. Lambert,Debt Swaps for Sustainable Development (1996).
46 T. Hamlin, ‘Debt-for-Nature Swaps: A New Strategy for Protecting Environmental Interests in Developing
Nations’, (1989) 16 Ecology Law Quarterly 1065.
47 E. J. Gibson and R. K. Curtis, ‘A Debt-for-Nature Blueprint’, (1990) 28 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law
331.
48 For a thoughtful taxonomy of the ‘anxieties’ that accountability concerns encompass, see J. L. Mashaw,
‘Accountability and Institutional Design: Some Thoughts on the Grammar of Governance’, inM.W. Dowdle
(ed.), Public Accountability: Designs, Dilemmas and Experiences (2006), 115. On legitimacy, see D. Bodansky,
‘Legitimacy’, in D. Bodansky, J. Brunne´e, and E. Hey (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental
Law (2007), 704.
49 See, in particular, R. E. Scott and P. B. Stephan, The Limits of Leviathan: Contract Theory and the Enforcement of
International Law (2006).
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5. INSIGHTS FROM CONTRACT LAW
Transnational conservation agreements are not commonly framed as contracts.
Yet, thinking about these agreements as contracts is helpful, as it forces a textual
analysis–somethingthat is rarelydone–andbecause it invitesanacknowledgement
of thecomplexsocialandlegalcontextsof theseagreements.Morespecifically, a legal
or textual analysis of conservation agreements highlights important contractual
issues such as privity of contracts, the nature of the parties and their expectations
of creating binding legal relationships, the adequacy of consideration, terms of the
contract, dispute resolution provisions, and issues of applicable law.
Thinking about conservationagreements as contracts forces an engagementwith
the private-law aspects of these agreements. A contract-law analysis invites careful
analysis of unequal bargaining power. The principle of privity of contract means
that non-parties do not have rights to enforce or alter these contracts. Are there any
importantthirdparties leftoutoftheagreementwhowill,however,experiencethird-
party effects? The lack of any repository of private contractual agreements of this
naturemeans that the extent of contracting practices and the terms of conservation
contracts remain unknown. This gives rise to key concerns about the transparency
of these agreements and their negotiations.
Fairness in contract often refers to fairness between the specific parties rather
than to the wider issue of promoting a more equitable distribution of power and
wealth in society. This, in part, explains the tendency of courts to obliquely identify
sites of procedural irregularity rather than directly addressing the unfairness of the
contractual bargain.50 The fact that courts are themajor arbiters of fairness presents
a further challenge to ensuring fairness in transnational conservation contracts, as
there is no evidence that the courts are or will be used to enforce aspects of these
transnational agreements.
Contract-law scholars are quick to acknowledge that contracts are embedded
in the ‘social practices and norms in which they arise’.51 This presents particular
challenges for understanding transnational conservation contracts as theproduct of
a set of particular market and social realities. What does it mean, in a transnational
context, to understand contracts ‘as complex, societal arrangements that visibilize
and negotiate conflicting rationalities and interests’?52
A significant challengeposedby transnational conservationcontracts is tounder-
stand the extent to which these purportedly transnational agreements remain
embedded in Anglo-American neo-liberal frameworks of freedom of contract, party
autonomy, and liberal individualism. These principles operate as guiding assump-
tions underlying classical contract law,53 yet they may not ‘travel well’ across
50 For a more complete discussion of the case law on this point, see H. Collins, The Law of Contract (2003),
Chapter 13.
51 Ibid., at 25.
52 P.Zumbansen, ‘TheLawofSociety:Governance throughContract’,ComparativeResearch inLawandPolitical
Economy Research Paper 2/2007, i.
53 The term ‘classical’ contract law, as used here, refers to a body of rules formulated in Anglo-American
legal contexts in the nineteenth century. An analysis of the degree to which modern contract law departs
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different cultural contexts.54 Importantly, the reverence afforded to written con-
tracts byUScontract lawmaynotbe justified in a cross-cultural context.55 Moreover,
in certain countries, the contractual form may be considered ‘unnecessary, some-
times offensive, when rules of loyalty andmutual obligation structure the business
environment’.56 Guiding rules that are appropriate for individuals as contracting
partiesmaynot transferwell tosituations inwhichgovernmentsorcommunitiesare
contracting parties.57 We know that a small number of United States-based conser-
vation groups are the repeat authors of many conservation concession agreements
as well as other transnational conservation agreements. We do not know the ex-
tent towhich these agreements remain intractably rooted inAmerican contract-law
traditions.
There are also dangers implicit in framing conservation agreements as contracts.
One such danger is that invoking private law risks depoliticizing these agreements.
Framing conservation contracts as a private-law tool may forestall an inquiry into
the degree to which these agreements advance the wider public interest. A view of
private law as ‘the repository of our most persistent illusions about the autonomy
of law from politics’ is difficult to fully escape.58 Legal realists have long been
fighting a war to re-politicize contract law and to highlight the political stakes at is-
sue, including in ‘merely technical’ questions of contract interpretation.59 Thinking
about contracts as legal texts must not deflect from the larger questions that these
agreements raise.Why are companies and conservation groups the key actors in de-
fining which global habitats receive protection? What factors explain the unequal
geographic distribution of these agreements? What mechanisms for accountabil-
ity are included in these agreements? Is the anti-democratic nature of these often
top-down, imposed agreements justified by the urgency of the need for protecting
endangered species and threatened habitats? These questions also come to the fore
by situating conservation contracts within the wider debates shaping international
environmental law.
from these underlying assumptions for reasons of distributional fairness in different jurisdictions is beyond
the scope of this article. Yet, the assumptions of freedom of contract and sanctity of contract continue to
hold a dominant place in contract-law doctrine. The focus in this section on Anglo-American principles of
contract law reflects the fact that US conservation organizations are the principal architects of transnational
conservation contracts.
54 C. Leonard, ‘Beyond the Four Corners of aWritten Contract: A Global Challenge to US Contract Law’, (2009)
21 Pace ILR 1, at 3. Leonard draws here on William Twining’s work on legal concepts that ‘travel well’ and
‘travel badly’;W. Twining, ‘HaveConcepts,Will Travel: Analytical Jurisprudence in aGlobal Context’, (2005)
1 International Journal of Law in Context, 5.
55 Leonard, supra note 54, at 6.
56 P. Pattison and D. Herron, ‘The Mountains Are High and the Emperor Is Far Away: Sanctity of Contract in
China’, (2003) 40American Business Law Journal 459, at 487–8.
57 A. Schwartz and R. E. Scott, ‘Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law’, (2003) 113 Yale Law Journal
541, at 550 (arguing, analogously, that rules that are appropriate for individuals too often are applied to
sophisticated business parties).
58 E. J. Weinrib, ‘Corrective Justice and Formalism: The Care One Owes One’s Neighbors: Corrective Justice’,
(1992) 77 Iowa Law Review 403, at 403.
59 D. Kennedy, ‘The Political Stakes in “Merely Technical” Issues of Contract Law’, (2001) 1 European Review of
Private Law 7, at 7.
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6. INSIGHTS FROM INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Fairness theories in international environmental law are a product of the wider
fairness debates being waged in international law. It is thus not surprising that fair-
ness theory in international environmental lawhas developedwithin a state-centric
paradigm. Inthecontextof internationalclimate-changelaw, fairness isoftenframed
as an issue of ‘how countries of theworld shall allocate the burden of addressing global
climate change’.60 The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities fo-
cuses on how states are incongruently situated.61 Eli Louka, Thomas Franck, and
scholars writingwithin the ThirdWorld Approaches to International Law (TWAIL)
tradition have, in articulating theories of fairness, directed their theorizing to pub-
lic international environmental law, largely leaving aside private environmental
governance.62 Yet, important insights from their work can deepen our understand-
ing of transnational conservation contracts. Thomas Franck’s detailed scholarship
on fairness expounds a theory inwhich nations complywith international rules be-
cause of the fairness of the rules themselves. This fairness speaks to considerations
of both fair process (legitimacy) and distributive justice.63
TWAIL theorist Bhupinder Chimni argues that a global imperial state is being
developedbya ‘transnational corporate class’ and this state is replacingnot the struc-
tures of government, but the functions.64 Chimni’s concern about the usurpation
of government function by non-state actors resonates with the practice of environ-
mental contracting and the key roles of non-state actors as the contracting parties
to conservation contracts. There is a definite tension between conservation con-
tracts, which are often debated behind closed doors and announced through a news
conference, and emerging best practices of inclusive, transparent, and participatory
international environmental decision-making.65 To justify the democratic deficits
associated with conservation deal-making, the urgency of protecting endangered
species and places is frequently evoked.
Theories of consent are foundational in both international law and contract law.
Who is giving consent in transnational conservation contract settings? Are women
negotiatingtheseagreements?CiaranO’Faircheallaigh,whohasbeenpresentduring
thenegotiationsofmanyagreementsbetween indigenous communities andmining
companies, points to the challenges in knowingwhetherwomen are excluded from
these negotiations or whether their interests are neglected:
60 F. Soltau, Fairness in Climate Change Law and Policy (2009), i (emphasis added).
61 See, e.g., L.Rajamani, ‘ThePrincipleofCommonbutDifferentiatedResponsibilityand theBalanceofCommit-
ments under theClimateRegime’, (2000) 9Review of EuropeanCommunity and International Environmental Law
120; D. French, ‘Developing States and International Environmental Law: The Importance of Differentiated
Responsibilities’, (2000) 49 ICLQ 35.
62 T. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (1995); E. Louka, International Environmental Law:
Fairness, Effectiveness and World Order (2006); B. S. Chimni, ‘International Institutions Today: An Imperial
Global State in theMaking’, (2004) 15 EJIL 1.
63 Franck, supra note 62.
64 Chimni, supra note 62.
65 Mechanisms for improving public participation in international law-making are the subject of significant
scholarly interest; see, e.g., J. Ebbesson, ‘The Notion of Public Participation in International Environmental
Law’, (1997) 8 YIEL 59.
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These are not easy questions to answer. Many agreements are confidential, and the
negotiations that lead to themevenmoreso . . . . Evenwhere it ispossible for researchers
to gain access to formal negotiations, many critical decisions are taken away from the
negotiating table, and the way decisions are revealed in a negotiation may indicate
little about who was and was not influential in making them.66
Theorizing about fairness in international environmental lawbrings into particular
focus concerns aboutprocedural fairness. Scholarshipon fairness gravitates towards
procedureasthesiteofmostsignificantpotential forfairnessreforms.67Whatisoften
lacking is a determination of the end that procedural fairness ought to serve. Proced-
ural fairness thus often fails to reference distributional fairness. The very concept
of transnational conservation contracts poses fairness problems. Agreements for
conservation performance payments, for example, may delink conservation from
community development and deprive local communities of their own legitimate
aspirations for land use. In other words, contractual mechanisms as market instru-
ments allow the international conservation community to ‘buy off’ resistance to
conservation initiatives – creating ‘treemuseums’ and, in the process, keeping local
populations at subsistence levels of income and economic development.68
A further fear is that it becomes the foreigners’ agenda for conservation that
dominates and ultimately replaces or erases the conservation agenda of the local
community. The very framing of contracts as instruments of conservation can
be problematic in a North–South context, as these agreements promote a view
of environmental concerns as discrete issues, rather than inseparable from eco-
nomic realities.69 Further, contracts can perpetuate problematic assumptions of
‘dark and poor peasant masses destroying forests and mountainsides’70 until deals
with developed-country conservation organizations bind them to a different reality.
These agreements can thus feed into problematic but prevalent assumptions that
developing countries are too busy addressing the demands of poverty alleviation to
seriously attend to environmental protection.71
Transnational conservation contracts represent the purchasing power of a
transnational elite and the power of the market to decide to offset environmental
damage,when the price is right. Law is not neutral in this process. Further empirical
work is needed to trace the extent to which powerful states (or non-state actors
within powerful states) use conservation contracts as a mechanism for exporting
legal norms. This article has pointed to several examples in which domestic-law
reforms have been necessary to pave the way for conservation contracts. Other
agreements, such as the Memorandum of Understanding between Guyana and
66 C. O’Faircheallaigh, ‘IndigenousWomen and Mining Agreement Negotiations: Australia and Canada’, in K.
Lahiri-Dutt (ed.),Gendering the Field: Towards Sustainable Livelihoods for Mining Communities (2011), 87, at 88.
67 See, e.g., R. Mushkat, International Environmental Law and Asian Values: Legal Norms and Cultural Influences
(2004), 91; J. Razzaque, ‘Human Rights to a Clean Environment: Procedural Rights’, in M. Fitzmaurice et al.
(eds.), Research Handbook On International Environmental Law (2010), 284.
68 F. Van Dyke, Conservation Biology: Foundations, Concepts, Applications (2008), 411.
69 B. Richardson, ‘Environmental Law in Postcolonial Societies: Straddling the Local–Global Institutional
Spectrum’, (2000) 11 Colorado Journal of Environmental Law & Policy 1, at 2.
70 K. Mickelson, ‘Critical Approaches’, in Bodansky, Brunne´e, and Hey, supra note 48, at 278.
71 P. F. Steinberg, Environmental Leadership in Developing Countries (2001).
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Norway on forest conservation,72 mandate participation in transnational legal pro-
cesses such as the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative. These examples of
domestic and transnational legal reforms speak to the deeper, and less apparent,
public significance of contractual agreements.
7. CONCLUSION: FAIRNESS AND TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW
Theaimofthisarticleistoflagtheemergenceoftransnationalconservationcontracts
as a phenomenon deserving of wider empirical and theoretical study. It argues for
the relevance of law in interpreting both individual contracts and the practice of
contracting. Conservation contracts provide an opportunity to think about fairness
intransnationalenvironmental lawinawaythatextendsratherthansimplyrecycles
fairness thinking in domestic and international law. These fairness concerns reflect
the lingeringdiscomfort that accompanies amoveaway fromstate-basednegotiated
forms of environmental governance. Fairness in transnational environmental law
means adjusting to roles in which non-state actors are not just campaigners, but are
the principal architects of environmental agreements; where access to information
is threatened by private agreements and closed-door negotiating processes; where
identifying sources of authority and channels of accountability becomes compli-
cated. Fairness concerns in transnational environmental law thus often centre on
therisks thatarise fromarescalingofenvironmentalgovernanceandtheconsequent
impactofprivate contractsonconstituencies thathave little say in theirnegotiation.
Transnational conservationcontracts arebutoneexampleofa turn tocontracts as
amechanismforgoverning transnational issuesgenerally, andenvironmental issues
more specifically.73 Negotiated contracts betweenpolluters and regulators are devel-
oping as a regulatory option inEurope and in anumber of other countries.74 Climate
contracts are advocated as a ‘second-best’ but practical approach to address global
warming.75 Supply-chain contracts increasingly govern environmental standards
and food safety.76 It is time for lawyers and legal scholars to step up their critical
engagement with transnational conservation contracts. Absent this engagement,
wewill continue towitness law’smarginalization to the ‘merely technical’ issues of
contract law.
72 See the discussion accompanying note 30, supra.
73 On governance through contract as a dominant mode of transnational regulation, see C. Scott, F. Cafaggi,
and L. Senden, ‘The Conceptual and Constitutional Challenge of Transnational Private Regulation’, (2011)
38 Journal of Law and Society 1, at 15.
74 E.W. Orts and K. Deketelaere (eds.), Environmental Contracts: Comparative Approaches to Regulatory Innovation
in the United States and Europe (2001).
75 E.W. Orts, ‘Climate Contracts’, (2011) 29Virginia Environmental Law Journal 197, at 205.
76 F. Cafaggi, ‘Private Regulation, Supply Chain, and Contractual Networks: The Case of Food Safety’, Florence:
EUIWorking Paper, 2010.
